In Great Britain as in many international markets, a wave of investment in renewable electricity has made connection capacity increasingly scarce in recent years. While policymakers face a surplus of capacity, the projects in the connection queue are not aligned with system needs. Based on data on connection queue attrition, the National Energy System Operator (NESO) estimates developers may never build up to 70% of projects in the current queue. Stalled projects and oversupplied technologies are holding back network capacity and queue positions from technologies needed for Clean Power 2030 (CP30), including onshore and offshore wind.

Long waiting times in Great Britain’s queue have created uncertainty for investors and ultimately hamper progress towards decarbonisation by delaying the connection of the projects most needed to decarbonise the system. Moreover, since network companies must plan for connection works based on the current queue, the queue is sending misleading signals on the types of expansion and reinforcement investments the networks need to achieve decarbonisation targets. 

On 14 February 2025, Ofgem issued a consultation on NESO’s proposed connections reform. The consultation implements NESO’s proposed Target Model Option 4+ (TMO4+). Ofgem’s consultation on TMO4+ is the latest step in a connections reform process that has spanned several years. While TMO4+ shifts the connections problem to a different decision-making process (“NESO Picks”), Senior Managing Director George Anstey and Economic Analyst Giovanni Raiteri explain it does not fully deal with the challenges currently underlying the connections queue and may create new problems entirely of its own.

Ultimately, the authors emphasise that TMO4+ replaces “First Come, First Served” with “NESO Picks,” so the effectiveness of the reform relies heavily on NESO’s judgement as to which projects are “ready” and “needed.” Keen observers will note that, not for the first time in recent years, Ofgem and NESO have bypassed fixing market signals in response to the failure of the invisible hand of the market. Instead, they have reached for the all too visible hand of the central planner. The authors conclude that it remains to be seen how industry will react to the reordering of their connection dates.